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International trade, the network that underpins globalization, shows an extreme inequality. Despite efforts of multilateral or-
ganizations to foster a more fair world through trade agreements, it is hard to assess the effect of these changes on such a complex
system. We have measured, using numerical simulation on a recently published network model, the impact of simple policies to
boost trade chances among the weakest economies. Results suggest that global inequality may be reduced improving trade among
low-income economies.
1. Introduction
Trade liberalization creates larger gains than losses for most
of the world [1]. However, in most low- and middle-income
economies, the prevailing tariff structure induces sizable
welfare losses. What could happen if that structure changed?
What would happen if low- and middle-income economies
increased trade between them? In this paper, we test whether
an increase in the participation on the global trade network
for low- and middle-income economies would generate a
more balanced network and, consequently, a more fair
distribution of the gains and losses derived from it. Regional
and economic country groupings follow World Bank’s
classifications. From the economic point of view, we use the
term “low- and middle-income economies”, rather than
“developing countries” or “developing world,” to define the
policy target; we contemplate income differences without
assuming additional barriers on their economic progress [2].
)emissing globalization puzzle [3] stresses that that the
volume of trade has become increasingly sensitive to dis-
tance in the last 40 years. )is paradoxical result, given the
reduction in communications and transport costs, is par-
ticularly strong for low- and middle-income economies;
poorest countries have increased their trade share with
geographically closer partners as the relative trade costs with
them fell more than with further-away partners [4]. Despite
this fact, the fraction of trade within this group is tiny
compared to the global figure.
Trade inequality is easy to measure because statistical
series are well curated. Empirical data and the available
research on international trade have shown that some
countries are underrepresented in the global trade network;
their participation on it is below their share of Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP). Conversely, other economies are
overrepresented [5, 6].
Economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that the
creation of a more equal international trade network may be
achieved through different complementary channels: pref-
erential trade agreements, global value chains integration
[7], industrial policy reforms [8–10], and migration strat-
egies [11]. However, the experimental validation and
quantitative assessment of the global impact of a particular
policy are a hard challenge.
Numerical simulation is a convenient way to address this
kind of problems where the system is so complex. Network
models are a nice choice for trade among nations and so it is
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)e stochastic model developed in [17] produced syn-
thetic networks with a high degree of adjustment to inter-
national trade flows from 1962 to 2017. Its generative
mechanism suggests that inequality is a structural property
of the network. )e volume traded by the most connected
nodes tends to have a value higher than that corresponding
to a random process, a well-known property of some
weighted complex networks as the WTN [18]. )is distri-
bution emerges as the product of a simple multiplicative
process where probabilities are proportional to the fraction
of global trade of each country. However, what happens if
some external policy improves the chances of the weak
players?
Belloc and Di Maio summarized the most successful
strategies and practices for export promotion by low- and
middle-income economies [19]. Of all the policies proposed,
the establishment of new trade deals is the most straight-
forward policy tool to increase trade participation.)e other
alternatives (increase productivity, institutional develop-
ment, etc.) would depend more on the organic evolution of
the different economies; they cannot be contemplated as a
one-act external policy.
In this paper, we examine if a politically driven increase
of trade among underrepresented countries, regionally and
globally, would contribute to a more balanced and equal
network. We build synthetic networks and disturb their
organic growth by boosting the trade chances of a small
fraction of nations.
We analyze the impact that an increase in trade derived
from new trade dealing within this set would have on the
equity of the network, measured through the Gini index. We
simulate those agreements between pairs of countries ranked
in the bottom 1%, 2%, and 5% of the global trade probability
distribution, both regionally (underrepresented countries
reach an agreement with underrepresented countries in their
same region) and globally (without regional limitations).
2. Materials and Methods
We work with the historical data series curated by the Ob-
servatory of Economic Complexity [20]. )is collection
contains yearly records of traded merchandise in US dollars
per product category between two countries, from 1962 to
2017. We study the trade volume, just adding the monetary
value of all exchanged goods between each pair of exporter/
importer to build the empirical weighted matrix. As com-
putations are quite time-intensive, we have focused our at-
tention on the last available years, from 2010 to 2017, adding
2005 to have a sample of the pre-Lehman Brothers crisis.
)e empirical network is bipartite, with two guilds:
exporters and importers with each country playing a dual
role. For instance, the node for Germany as exporter country
is different from the node of Germany as importer. )e
yearly aggregated trade flow between two countries is a
weighted link directed from ExporterA to ImporterB. )e
network is bidirectional as the value of traded goods and
services from ExporterB to ImporterA is different from that
in the opposite direction.)emodel deals with each year as a
different network and there is no memory from year to year.
)e number of links of each node is called degree and it is the
number of countries it trades with. Strength is the sum of
weights of any given node. Distributions of degree and
strength are a valuable source of information of network
properties [21].
We apply a soft mitigation strategy to deal with the
heterogeneous data classification and sources over such a
long span of time, and we filter the links that fall within the
lower 0.1% of the trade distribution to avoid the strongly
meshed condition [22]. We refer to the original paper for
details [17].
To emulate the dynamics of the WTN, we use the
Synthrade stochastic model. Network growth is driven by
two different mechanisms. )e first one, called node ag-
gregation regime, acts during a short period of emulation
time, under the hypothesis of neutrality. Nodes arrive at a
pace that is a function of the cardinality of its own guild at a
particular simulation instant and attach to opposite class
nodes by preferential attachment [23]. When the synthetic
network matrix reaches the dimensions of the empirical one,
this process stops at tF that we call formation instant. )e
second one drives the birth and weight accretion of trade
links. At each simulation step, the volume traded by any pair
of countries may raise according to an stochastic aggregation
process. )e probability for each cell is the product of
marginal probabilities of its importer and exporter edges.
)ese marginal probabilities equal the ratio of traded goods
of each country divided by the total yearly world trade. With
this simple mechanism, theweight aggregation regime shapes
the synthetic network until its number of links reaches the
number of links of the empirical one. )e emulation time
grows up as O(n2).
A goodness-of-fit analysis of the Kolmogorov distance
between empirical and synthetic distributions revealed
that synthetic matrices are a fair statistical approximation.
Figure 1 shows how the synthetic matrix closely follows the
empirical distribution although it is less noisy. )e synthetic
matrix does not convey regional information.
Synthrade is a phenomenological approximation, but its
simplicity provides some useful hints. As each cell of the
probability matrix is proportional to the trade it represents,
major world traders keep on growing during all the simu-
lation time. Proportionality is the origin of the extremely
skewed volume distribution that closely fits as a log-normal
that arises as a result of the multiplicative process [24, 25].
Inequality is a structural property of the network and is self-
sustained, an example of the Matthew Effect in the inter-
national trade [26].
Not all mitigation strategies would work under these
circumstances. If trade barriers are lowered without ex-
ception for weak economies, powerful nodes will attract new
chances. )e overall effect is maintaining the imbalance.
Raising tariffs, on the other hand, just worsens the isolation
of minor players.
Our aim has been to assess the impact of policies to
improve trade just among underrepresented countries. We
have modified the original model to take into account
geographical information. Policies are implemented with a
simple function.
2 Complexity
For the first purpose, we use the Lending Group clas-
sification of the World Bank that defines seven regions [27].
We must perform a first step, to identify which country is
each node. )is decision is not trivial; we know the final
picture that sheds the empirical matrix, but as Synthrade
builds a growing model its size is not fixed and the relative
position of each node can be modified along time. As our
previous work showed, the distribution shape is quite the
same from tF up to the end of the experiment, so nodes are
labeled at the formation instant with the country names of
the empirical distribution.
Once the table that relates countries and regions is built,
policies may be applied and they will affect the experiment
during the weight aggregation regime. )at means more
than 90% of the experiment simulation time.
To make it simpler, we simulate the impact of trade
agreements modifying three parameters: improved trade
percentage, boost percentage, and scope. With the first one,
we select those nodes that are eligible for the improvement
policy. For instance, the value of 1% discards all probability
matrix cells (exporter/importer pair products) in the upper
99% of the distribution. )e policy only benefits trade
among weak nodes, whose individuals’ contributions to
global trade are tiny. )is selection is performed at each
step of the simulation after tF. )e boost percentage ranges
from 25% to 200% and is the increase in the probability of
that particular matrix cell (obviously, the probability
matrix must be normalized after applying this procedure).
We do not make any assumption about the political or
technical nature of the improvement policy; for that par-
ticular pair of weak nodes, the trade probability rises. Fi-
nally, the scope factor restricts the policy to countries that
belong to the same region or extends it to whatever pair of
countries if they met the improved trade percentage
condition.
For each year, we have built 30 synthetic experiments
without any kind of improvement and 30 for each
combination of scope (global, regional), improved trade
fraction (1%, 2%, and 5%), and boost percentage (from 25% to
200% by 25% steps). )at makes 1470 experiments per year
and a total of 13230 synthetic networks built.
To assess inequality, we use the Gini index of both the
exporter and importer normalized strength distributions
[28]. )e estimation of the Gini index may be problematic
with infinite variance distributions, as these we are dealing
with, because of underestimation [29]. Our study focuses
on the comparative evolution of inequality before and after
the application of a mitigation policy on a synthetic model,
so we think that Gini is a good enough proxy for this
purpose.
3. Results
To set a baseline for comparisons, we compute the Gini
indexes of the empirical networks and those of the set of
30 synthetic experiments without improvement policies
(Figure 2). )e average values of the Gini indexes for both
exporter and importer series of the empirical matrices are,
respectively, 0.82 and 0.81. )e synthetic networks overes-
timate this parameter by a 6%, and the average Gini values
are 0.86 for both distributions. As we mentioned, the syn-
thetic networks are less noisy than the empirical ones, and
small disorder is the origin of this offset.
As the statistical differences between exporter and im-
porter distributions are minimal, we show just the results for
the latter.
)e improvement policy raises the chances of weak nodes
to attract trade chances and acts only upon the intraweak
trade.)e goal is divesting a small volume of global exchanges
towards the lower tail of the original distribution.
)e upper row in Figure 3 shows, from left to right, the
synthetic matrix without improvement policy, with a mild
policy (50% boost), and with the strongest one (200%) for

























Figure 1: Empirical and synthetic trade matrices for year 2017. Normalized weight matrices WEI/􏽐ijWEI: (a) empirical and (b) synthetic.
Color is assigned according to the normalized weight of that particular yearly trade volume. )e synthetic matrix is the result of running a














































































Figure 2: Gini indexes. Comparison of the Gini indexes for empirical networks and a set of 30 synthetic networks for each one: (a) exporter









































































Figure 3: Synthetic matrices for year 2011. (a) Normalized weight network. (b) Result with 50% boosted probability for the lower 2% of
global trade, with no regional restrictions. (c) )e same with 200% boosted probability. Under these three plots (d), (e), and (f) are the heat
maps of each corresponding final probability matrix.
4 Complexity
same for the three matrices as they share number of nodes,
number of links, and build-up mechanism. )e color map
allows to detect how the gradient gets smoother, with more
nodes in the middle range of values (light blue).
)is shift is more evident in the corresponding proba-
bility matrices. )e area of cells with tiny trade values (dark
blue) shrinks as the improvement policy fosters a more
equitable distribution.
For any given year, both degree and normalized
strength distributions are nearly log-normal. )e policy
should not modify degree distributions, as Figures 4(a)
and 4(b) show, except for the lower tail, where there is a
higher chance of connection of weaker nodes. )e con-
trast with strength distributions, on the contrary, is quite
sharp. As the impact of the policy gets more aggressive,
the shape of the distribution gets narrower, trade volumes
are now more equitable, and so the dispersion decreases.
)e upper tail seems unshakeable. )e logarithmic nature
of this distribution makes it possible to get a more even
share of world trade without a radical change of its
structure.
)e Gini coefficient of the importer distribution falls
from 0.863, when nomitigation policy is applied, to 0.744 for
a trade boost of 100% and 0.691 if the trade boost is raised up
to 200%, as far as there are no regional restrictions. If the
policy excludes interregional exchanges, then the reduction
is quite smaller, from 0.863 to 0.802.
)e Gini reduction for the year 2005 (Figure 5) without
regional restrictions may be fitted by a second-order
polynomial:
y � 3.16 · 10− 6x2 − 0.00147x + 0.861, (1)
where y is the average Gini index and x is the trade boost.
)e adjusted R2 value is 99.6. For the regional series, a linear
regression yields an accurate predictor:
y � −3.1 · 10− 4x + 0.864. (2)
)e adjusted R2 value is 99.4. Figure 6 shows both the
computed average series and the results of the predictors.
Improvement figures and fair adjustment to both types
of predictor models are quite similar for every year we have
included in this study.
)e linear law, with regional restrictions, has a constant
negative slope and so the Gini coefficient reduction is
proportional to the boosting percentage. )e slope of the
quadratic formula for the global improvement, however,
suggests that boosting effect saturates.
So far, all the results were computed choosing the lower 2%
fraction of global trade.)is factor seems to have little impact in
the Gini index reduction (Figure 7). A 2% yields, in general, the
best performance, very close to the results with 1%, whereas
reduction is less step applying the policy to the lower 5%.
)e effect on the trade distribution of the seven regions
(Lending Groups) is quite complex (Figure 8). EUCA and
SASIA follow closely the global pattern. MENA and LAC
show mild increases at higher boost percentages. )is un-
expected behavior is stronger for SSAF. Improving the
chances of intraregional trade seems to increase inequality.
)e reason behind that is that trade volume for weaker
countries is so small that minor changes in the long tail
distribution have a strong overall effect. LAC, MENA, and
SSAF have relatively moderate intraregional Gini index
values and so are more sensitive. When trade agreements are
not restricted to the intraregional trade the Gini index is
always reduced. Finally, NAM only comprises USA, Canada,
and tiny islands (Mexico belongs to LAC in this classifi-
cation). Policies cannot have any effect as both nations are
strong international trade players.
4. Discussion
)e stochastic model of theWorld Trade Network works as a
digital testbed to compare the effects assessment of in-
equality mitigation policies.
)e results of the numerical experiments show that trade
agreements between underrepresented countries with no
regional limitations have a sensible larger impact on re-
ducing inequality of the international trade network than
deals limited to the same region. Results also confirm one of
the network’s most relevant properties: self-fulfilling
structural inequality.Matthew Effect applies for the different
trade boosts simulated for 1%, 2%, and 5% underrepresented
countries; in order to reduce the Gini index of the inter-
national trade network, it is more effective to promote trade
agreements among the bottom 1% of countries than among
the bottom 5%.
)is striking fact has a simple explanation, as trade volume
distributions are log-normal. If the policy applies to the lower
5% of countries, the best-in-class of this group will have a high
advantage over the weakest to attract the improved fraction of
trade. For instance, the Gini indexes of SSAF and MENA
worsen if improvement is restricted to the same regional group
trade.
Pushing the policy to the limit, the structural network
inequality would always benefit the strongest nodes. On the
contrary, countries of the lower 1% are more even in their
trade poverty, and a small general boosting has a notable
effect on global inequality.
We have found two additional insights that may be helpful
to design and deploy these kinds of policies. First, Gini index
reduction has no sensible effect on the right tail of the distri-
bution, and major traders are not threatened. Second, the
improvement ratio, without regional restrictions, follows a
quadratic pattern. Even small actions may reduce inequality if




















Figure 5: Effect of the improvement policy for year 2005. )e policy is applied to the lower 2% of global trade. Dots are the results of
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Figure 4: Density distributions for year 2005. (a) Degree. (b) Normalized strength. Plots show the values of the original synthetic ex-
periment and two improved networks with probability boost of 50% and 200% for the lower 2% of global trade without regional restrictions.
6 Complexity
Two important implications can be derived from these
findings. First, to increase the representation of poorest
countries in the international trade network, trade agree-
ments between underrepresented countries should be pro-
moted globally and not only through regional blocks;
overcoming the missing globalization puzzle would be key
for the establishment of a more balanced network. Second,
the persistence of the Matthew Effect suggests that, beyond
those trade agreements, inequality is a structural property of
the network.
)e current trend towards deglobalization and pro-
tectionism on developed countries should not become an
obstacle to follow the policy course recommended in this
article. Countries can improve their representation on

























Figure 7: Effect of the improvement policies for year 2017. Reduction of Gini index for the importer distribution as a function of the policy.
Regional


















Figure 6: Computed and predicted average improved importer Gini indexes for year 2005. A second-order polynomial was fitted to the
global data while regional data follows a linear model.
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Data Availability
Data are available from the following link: https://zenodo.
org/badge/latestdoi/241584918.
Additional Points
Programming language is R. Gini indexes of exporter and
importer normalized strength distributions were computed
with the package ineq 0.2.13 [30] and densities estimations
are plotted with the ggplot2 [31] (geom_density() with
bandwidth adjustment� 2).
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